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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW-THE SUPREME COURT 
LOOKS AT THE "BOTTOM LINE"-Conneclicul v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 
(1982). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In December, 1978, 329 employees of the Department of In­
come Maintenance of the State of Connecticut took an examination 
for promotion to supervisory status. I Shortly after the results of the 
examination were announced, several black employees who failed 
the test instituted a suit against the State of Connecticut.2 The em­
ployees alleged that the test barred a disproportionate number of 
blacks from consideration for promotion in violation of Section 
703(a)(2) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 As a result of 
the alleged disparate impact,4 the plaintiffs argued that they had es­
tablished a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Ti­
1. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 443 (1982). 
2. ld. 
3. ld. at 444. Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
provides: 
(a) 	 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer­
(2) 	 to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employ­
ment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ­
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, reli­
gion, sex, or national origin. 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e - 2(A)(2) (1976). 
4. The Supreme Court has recognized two theories plaintiffs may use to prove dis­
crimination in Title VII cases - disparate impact and disparate treatment. Teamsters v. 
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977). Disparate impact analysis is used to 
challenge specific employment practices, such as an examination. Although the specific 
practice may not be discriminatory on its face, disparate impact occurs when the results 
of such a facially neutral practice fall more harshly on a racial minority or women than 
on the racial majority or males. Proof of the employer's discriminatory motive is not 
required. ld. Under disparate treatment analysis the employer is accused of treating 
some people less favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or na­
tional origin. ld. Mere proof of adverse impact is not sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of disparate treatment. The plaintiff must prove the employer's discriminatory in­
tent. ld. See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
1-12 (1976). The disparate impact "rule" essentially states that the plaintiff must show 
that a facially neutral employment practice has a significant discriminatory impact on the 
plaintifrs group. If the showing is made, the plaintiff has established a prima facie case 
of employment discrimination. The burden of proof then shifts and the defendant-em­
ployer must demonstrate that the requirement is related to the job. If the requirement is 
not proven to be job-related, then the defendant-employer will be liable for a violation of 
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The state responded that it should not be liable for the alleged 
discrimination because the "bottom line" result of the promotional 
process was not discriminatory.6 
The United States Supreme Court, in Connecticut Y. Teal,7 held 
that the state's nondiscriminatory bottom line did not preclude the 
plaintiffs from establishing a prima facie case nor did it provide the 
state with a defense. 8 
This casenote will evalute the Supreme Court's decision in Teal. 
It will examine the Court's rationale for focusing on a particular 
element of an employment selection process,9 rather than on the 
final result of that process in a disparate impact case.lO It will also 
examine to what extent the Court's decision in Teal has further de­
fined the focus of the disparate impact principle. I I Finally, the note 
will discuss the further utility of the bottom line defense in light of 
Tea/ 12 and the applicability of the Uniform Guidelines On Em­
ployee Selection Procedures. 13 
II. HISTORY OF TEAL 
In 1976, Winnie Teal and three other black women employed 
Title VII, and vice versa. For a discussion ofthe source of the disparate impact principle 
see infra text accompanying notes 45-52. 
5. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 444 (1982). 
6. Id. The bottom line concept in employment discrimination law has as its pri­
mary focus the percentage of minorities or women actually hired rather than any single 
criterion in the overall hiring process. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1191. 
In Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), the state asserted that there was no disparate 
impact on blacks because the bottom line percentage of blacks hired exceeded the per­
centage of whites hired. Id. at 444. See infra text accompanying notes 25-28. 
7. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
8. Id. at 442. 
9. Elements of an employment selection process typically include: scored tests, 
e.g., a passing score on a general intelligence test as a prerequisite for hire; nonscored 
objective criteria, e.g. , a requirement of a high school diploma as a prerequisite for hire; 
and subjective criteria, e.g. , a policy of discharging all employees whose wages are gar­
nished a specific number of times. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at I n.3. 
10. For a discussion of the Court's rationale in Teal see infra text accompanying 
notes 95-10 1. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 104-1\ 1. 
12. See infra text- accompanying notes 1\2-1\6. 
13. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.IB 
(1982). These guidelines, designed to assist employers in complying with federal law 
prohibitions against discriminatory employment practices, are issued jointly by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter EEOC) and three other government 
agencies. Id. § 1607.1A. See infra text accompanying notes 117-130 for a discussion of 
the applicability of the guidelines to Teal. 
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by the Department of Income Maintenance of the State of Connecti­
cut, were promoted provisionally to the position of Welfare Eligibil­
ity Supervisor.14 All four women served as supervisors for almost 
two years. IS In order to attain permanent supervisory status, they 
were required to participate in a selection process. 16 The first step in 
that process was successful completion of a written test.J7 
On December 2, 1978, 329 candidates took the test. IS Forty­
eight identified themselves as black; 259 identified themselves as 
white. 19 When the test results were announced in March, 1979, 
14. 457 U.S. at 443. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. The written examination was the only formal step in the selection process. 
The examination generated an eligibility list from which selections were later made. Id. 
See infra text accompanying notes 25-26. In selecting persons from the eligiblity list the 
state considered past work performance, recommendations of the candidates' supervi­
sors, seniority, and an affirmative action program. 457 U.S. at 444. The subjective na­
ture of these considerations prompted the plaintiffs to state: ''The present case involves a 
selection procedure by the petitioners to determine promotional eligibility which proce­
dure consisted of a single component, the test in question." Brief for Respondents at 21, 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). 
The test itself was developed jointly by the Personnel Department and the Income 
Maintenance Department of the State of Connecticut. Joint Appendix at A108, Teal v. 
Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Joint Appendix]. The test was 
designed to measure five basic job factors: I) the objectives of public assistance and 
departmental structure; 2) the basic principles of training; 3) the principles of supervi­
sion; 4) public assistance eligibility requirements; and 5) basic social service unit manage­
ment techniques. Id. at A43. The testing mode chosen to measure these characteristics 
was a "work sample format", which simulated job conditions in an attempt to assure 
direct job-relatedness. Id. at A105. 
The three hour exam placed the candidate in the position of a Welfare Eligibility 
Supervisor and required each candidate to respond to a series of job-related problem 
situations. Id. at A42. Part one, worth 86 points, was composed of the problem situa­
tions themselves and multiple choice questions about them. Part two, worth 14 points, 
was a rating exercise where the candidate was required to prioritize each of the problem 
situations presented in Part one, with one being the highest priority and three being the 
lowest. Id. at A97. The priority rating assigned to each item was made in relation to all 
the other items. The candidates were also required to briefly explain their rating for each 
item. Id. 
18. 457 U.S. at 443. Since it was promotional, only those persons already em­
ployed by the Department of Income Maintenance were eligible to take the test. This is 
in accordance with the State of Connecticut's "promote from within" policy. Telephone 
interview with Patricia Craig, Senior Personnel Analyst, Personnel Division, Department 
of Administrative Services, State of Connecticut (Jan. 20, 1983). 
19. 457 U.S. at 443. The remaining candidates were as follows: Hispanic - 4; In­
dian - 3; Unidentified - 15. Id. at n.4. All 329 candidates taking the examination "were 
requested to indicate their race and sex in specially designated spaces on their answer 
sheet. This was done on a purely voluntary basis; candidates were assured that the infor­
mation was to be used purely for research purposes only and would in no way affect their 
eligibility or standing." Joint Appendix, supra note 17, at A120. 
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54.17% of the black candidates and 79.54% of the white candidates 
had passed.20 The passing rate for blacks was thus approximately 
68% of the passing rate for whites.21 The plaintiffs were among those 
who failed the exam and were excluded from further consideration 
for permanent supervisory positions.22 
In April, 1979, the plaintiffs instituted an action in the United 
States District Court for the District of Connecticut.23 They alleged 
that the defendant violated Title VII by requiring, as an absolute 
condition for consideration for promotion, that the applicants pass a 
written test unrelated to the job and that excluded blacks in dispro­
. portionate numbers.24 
Notwithstanding the pending suit, the state continued its pro­
motional process. More than one year after the action was com­
menced, and approximately one month before trial, the state 
completed its process and promoted 46 persons to permanent status 
20. 457 U.S. at 443 n.4. Teal involved the use of comparative rather than demo­
graphic statistics. Comparative statistics, sometimes called applicant flow data, are lim­
ited in scope to actual participants in the employment process while demographic 
statistics look to general population data in the relevant labor market. Note, Disparate 
Impact and Disparate Treatment: The Prima Facie Case Under Title VII, 32 ARK. L. 
REv. 571, 578 (1978). Here, the plaintiffs are comparing the passing rate for blacks to the 
passing rate for whites to prove the disparate impact of the test. 457 U.S. at 443 n.4. 
21. 457 U.S. at 443. This 68% figure is important to the plaintiffs' task of proving 
that the written test had a discriminatory impact on blacks in that it offended the Uni­
form Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures. The Uniform Guidelines 
are designed to assist employers, labor organizations, employment agencies, 
and licensing and certification boards to comply with requirements of Federal 
law prohibiting employment practices which discriminate on grounds of race, 
color, religion, sex, and national origin. They are designed to provide a frame­
work for determining the proper use of tests and other selection procedures. 
Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.IB (1982). 
The guidelines are issued jointly by the EEOC, the Civil Service Commission, the De­
partment of Labor, and the Department of Justice. /d. § 1607.1A. Section 1607.40 of 
the Uniform Guidelines states in part: 
A selection rate for any race, sex, or ethnic group which is less than four-fifths 
(4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for the group with the highest rate will 
generally be regarded by the Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of ad­
verse impact, while a greater than four-fifths rate will generally not ~e regarded 
by Federal enforcement agencies as evidence of adverse impact. 
Id. § 1607.40. Thus, because the test in Teal resulted in a selection rate for blacks that 
was only 68% of the rate for whites, there is little doubt that the examination had the 
disparate impact alleged by the plaintiffs. See 457 U.S. at 443 n.4. For a discussion of 
the weight accorded in Teal to § 1607.4C of the Uniform Guidelines, which deals with 
the bottom line issue, see infra text accompanying notes 117-130. 
22. 457 U.S. at 443-44. 
23. Id. at 444. 
24. Id. See supra note 4. 
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as Welfare Eligibility Supervisors.25 This group consisted of 11 
blacks and 35 whites.26 Thus, the selection process resulted in the 
promotion of 22.9% of the black candidates, as compared to 13.5% of 
the white candidates.27 The state claimed that because the bottom 
line result was more favorable to blacks than whites, it should be a 
complete defense to plaintiffs' claim of disparate impact. 28 
Although the comparative passing rates for the exam indicated 
a prima facie case of adverse impact upon blacks, the district court 
entered judgment for the state.29 The court found that there was no 
violation of Title VII because the result of the entire process- i e. 
the bottom line-{jid not reflect a disparate impact on blacks.30 Ac­
cordingly, the state was not required to show that the test was job­
related.3! 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
stated that "the district court erred in ruling that the results of the 
written exam alone were insufficient to support a prima facie case of 
disparate impact in violation of Title VII."32 The Second Circuit 
proceeded to establish a test: 
[W]here a plaintiff establishes that a component of a selection pro­
cess produced disparate results and constituted a pass-fail barrier 
beyond which the complaining candidates were not permitted to 
proceed, a prima facie case of disparate impact is established, 
notwithstanding that the entire selection procedure did not yield 
disparate results.33 
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the district court and 
remanded the case for evaluation of the job-relatedness of the test.34 
Upon appeal by the state, the United States Supreme Court af­
25. 457 U.S. at 444. The plaintiffs claimed that the timing of the promotions cou­
pled with the fact that they were in favor of black candidates indicated that the defendant 
made selections in the face of litigation in an effort to avoid liability. Brief for Respon­
dents, supra note 17, at 23. The defendant denied this allegation. Reply Brief for Peti­
tioners at 4, Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). The Supreme Court made no 
mention of the propriety of the defendant's timing in making the promotions. 
26. 447 U.S. at 444. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 444-45. The opinion of the United States District Court for the District 
of Connecticut has not been officially reported. 
30. Id. at 445. 
31. Id. See supra note 4. 
32. Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1981). 
33. Id. at 135 (emphasis in original). 
34. Id. at 140. 
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firmed.35 The Court held that despite the nondiscriminatory bottom 
line, plaintiffs' claim of disparate impact established a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination under Section 703(a)(2) of Title 
VII.36 The Court stated that to measure disparate impact "only at 
the bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees . . . indi­
vidual[s] ... the opportunity to compete equally with white workers 
on the basis of job-related criteria."37 
The Court also held that the nondiscriminatory bottom line did 
not provide the state with a defense to plaintiffs' prima facie case. 
The Court stated: "It is clear that Congress never intended to give 
an employer license to discriminate against some employees on the 
basis of race or sex merely because he favorably treats other mem­
bers of the employees' group."38 
The dissenting opinion claimed that there was "no violation of 
Title VII on the basis of disparate impact in the absence of disparate 
impact on a group."39 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court, in determining that the nondiscriminatory 
bottom line did not preclude the employees from establishing a 
prima facie case under Section 703(a)(2),40 expanded the possible sit­
uations in which a plaintiff may make a prima facie case of employ­
ment discrimination.41 The Court had indicated previously that 
policies or practices used to select employees for hire or promotion42 
which resulted in disparate impact on minorities or women were not 
35. 457 U.S. at 445. Teal was a 5-4 decision. The majority opinion was written by 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. The dis­
senting opinion was written by Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Jus­
tices Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Id. at 456. 
36. Id. See supra note 3. 
37. 457 U.S. at 451 (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the majority opin­
ion see infra text accompanying notes 72-84. 
38. 457 U.S. at 455. 
39. Id. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See infra text accom­
panying notes 85-88. 
40. See supra note 3. 
41. See Annual Survey ofLabor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 23 
B.C.L. REV. 81, 275 (1981). Consistent with Teal, plaintiffs may establish a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination based on the disparate impact of a segment of the 
employment selection process even where the final result of the process reveals that there 
is no disparate impact on the plaintiffs group, i.e. no disparate impact at the bottom line. 
This is true, at least, in situations where the segment constitutes a pass-fail barrier be­
yond which failing candidates are not permitted to proceed. See infra text accompanying 
notes 112-116. . 
42. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. 
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free from judicial scrutiny. Nevertheless, the Court increased that 
judicial scrutiny by holding that the bottom line result of a selection 
process was not a defense to a prima facie case under the disparate 
impact theory,43 at least where a component of that process consti­
tuted a pass-fail barrier to consideration for employment or 
promotion.44 
A. Prior Disparate Impact Cases 
The Supreme Court had decided several cases involving dispa­
rate impact prior to its decision in Teal. In Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co. ,45 the defendant-employer required a high school education or a 
passing score on standardized general intelligence tests as a condi­
tion to employment in or transfer to jobs at its power plant.46 The 
plaintiff-employees claimed that because the requirements barred 
employment opportunities to a disproportionate number of blacks, 
they were unlawful under Title VII unless shown to be job-related.47 
The Court in Griggs found that the objective of Congress in en­
acting Title VII "was to achieve equality of employment opportuni­
ties and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees"48 but 
that "Congress did not intend. . . to guarantee a job to every person 
regardless of qualifications."49 From this, the Court concluded that 
"[i]f an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes can­
not be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is pro­
hibited."50 Although there was no showing of racial purpose or 
invidious intent on the part of the defendant-employer,51 the Court 
held that the job requirements were still invalid because they had a 
disparate impact on blacks and had not been shown to be related to 
job performance.52 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see infra 
text accompanying notes 45-69. 
43. See supra note 4. 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 112-116. 
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs has been called the most important decision in 
employment discrimination law. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 5. 
46. 401 U.S. at 425-26. 
47. Id. at 429. 
48. Id. at 429-30. For a discussion of how the Court in Teal uses this objective to 
shape its decisions see infra text accompanying notes 98-100. 
49. 401 U.S. at 430. 
50. Id. at 431. 
51. Id. at 432. 
52. Id. at 430-31. Regarding the question of job-relatedness, the Court in Griggs 
stated: 
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In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,53 the defendant-employer re­
quired applicants for employment in skilled jobs to have a high 
school diploma and to pass two tests. 54 The plaintiff-employees 
sought permanent injunctive relief against any policy, practice, cus­
tom or usage of the defendant-employer that violated Title VII, in­
cluding its program of employment testing. 55 On the eve of trial the 
defendant-employer, in response to the Griggs decision, did a study 
of the job-relatedness of its testing program. 56 The study showed 
that the tests were job-related.57 Although the district court accepted 
the study as proof of the job-relatedness of the test,58 the court of 
appeals and the Supreme Court did not.59 For various reasons, the 
Court held that the district court erred in concluding that the defend­
ant-employer's study had proven the job-relatedness of its testing 
program.60 
In Do/hard v. Rawlinson,61 the plaintiff claimed that the statu­
tory minimum height and weight requirements for correctional 
counselors in Alabama prisons were violative of Title VII.62 The 
On the record before us, neither the high school completion requirement 
nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear a demonstrable relationship to 
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used. Both were adopted 
... without meaningful study of their relationship to job-performance ability. 
Rather. . . the requirements were instituted on the Company's judgment that 
they generally would improve the overall quality of the work force. 
The evidence, however, shows that employees who have not completed 
high school or taken the tests have continued to perform satisfactorily and 
make progress in departments for which the high school and test criteria are 
now used. 
Id. at 431-32. 
53. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). 
54. Id. at 410. The tests used in Albemarle were the Revised Beta Examination 
and the Wonderlic Personnel Test which, according to the Court, measure nonverbal 
intelligence and verbal intelligence, respectively. Id. at 410-11. These are standardized 
tests, as opposed to the "in-house" test developed by the State of Connecticut which was 
taken by the plaintiffs in Teal. See supra note 17. 
55. 422 U.S. at 409. 
56. Id. at 411. The "study compared the test scores of current employees with 
supervisorial judgments of their competence in ten job groupings selected from the mid­
dle or top of the plant's skilled lines of progression." Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 430. 
60. Id. at 435-36. One reason given by the Supreme Court was the fact that the 
"study dealt only with job-experienced, white workers; but the tests themselves are given 
to new job applicants, who are younger, largely inexperienced, and in many instances 
nonwhite." Id. at 435. The Court remanded the case to the district court for a determi­
nation of the job-relatedness of the testing program. Id. at 436. 
61. . 433 U.S. 321 (1977). Do/hard involved sex, rather than racial, discrimination. 
62. Id. at 324. 
793 1983] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
plaintiff was refused employment because she failed to meet the 
minimum 120 pound weight requirement.63 The Supreme Court 
stated that "to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plain­
tiff need only show that the facially neutral standards in question 
select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pattern."64 
The plaintiff proved, through demographic statistics,65 that the 
height and weight requirements combined would exclude 41.13% of 
the female population while excluding less than 1% of the male pop­
ulation.66 The Court found that the height and weight standards had 
a discriminatory impact on female applicants.67 The defendant 
failed to prove that the requirements were job-related,68 and conse­
quently, the Court held that application of the statutory height and 
weight standards to plaintiff was in violation of Title VII.69 
Each of the foregoing cases support the concept, established in 
Griggs, that Title VII forbids the use of any employment require­
ments or practices which are discriminatory in effect, unless proven 
to be job-related.70 These cases, however, did not decide the bottom 
line issue presented in Teal. In each of these cases, disparate impact 
on minorities or women had been established by the final result of 
the selection process, rather than one step in the process, as in Teal. 
Nonetheless, the majority in Teal used Griggs and its progeny as a 
base from which to expand the possible circumstances under which a 
plaintiff may make a prima facie showing of employment 
discrimination.71 
63. Id. at 323. The minimum height requirement was 5 feet 2 inches. Id. at 324. 
64. /d. at 329. 
65. See supra note 20. 
66. 433 U.S. at 329-30. The plaintiff applied the 5'2" requirement to women in the 
United States between the ages of 18-79 and found that it would exclude 33.29% of the 
women, but only 1.28% of the men between the same ages. Id. at 329. The 120 pound 
requirement would exclude 22.29% of the women and 2.35% of the men in the same age 
group. Id. 
67. /d. at 331. 
68. /d. at 331-32. 
69. Id. at 332. Although it held the height and weight standards violative of Title 
VII, the Court concluded that women may be excluded from the job of "correctional 
counselor in a 'contact' position in an Alabama male maximum-security penitentiary." 
Id. at 337. The Court reasoned that a woman's contact with male prisoners, 20% of 
which were sex offenders, would directly hamper her ability to provide security, thereby 
posing a threat to herself, other security personnel, and control of the facility. Id. at 335­
37. 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52. 
71. Annual Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 23 
B.c.L. REV. 81, 275 (1981). 
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B. The Supreme Court's Opinion in Teal 
It has been said that the "deceptively simple holdings of Griggs 
. [have] been broadly applied in many contexts of employment 
discrimination law."72 As previously stated, Griggs did not decide 
the bottom line issue presented in Teal.73 Griggs held only that dis­
criminatory job requirements that are not shown to be job-related 
are prohibited under Title VII.74 Indeed, Griggs did not even discuss 
whether the final result of an employment selection process would 
preclude a prima facie case of discrimination under the disparate 
impact theory. The majority in Teal, however, ignored lower court 
decisions on the bottom line issue.75 By ignoring these lower court 
cases, the majority avoided the difficult task of distinguishing them 
from the case before the Court. Instead, the Court used other cases, 
such as Griggs and its progeny, to shape a decision that fulfilled the 
intent of Congress in enacting Title VII.76 Thus, because the Court 
based its decision on Griggs, a case that did not even discuss the 
issue presented in Teal, and ignored lower court precedent that dealt 
with the bottom lirie issue, it is clear that the Court has applied 
Griggs broadly. 
By using a broad application of Griggs, the Court in Teal was 
able to eliminate the barrier created by the test, thereby giving plain­
tiffs an opportunity for the relief they sought.77 In Teal, individual 
members of a protected group became the victims of the test's dispa­
rate impact on minorities. The Court recognized that these individu­
als were victims even though bottom line statistics showed that there 
was no discrimination against the protected group as a whole.78 As 
72. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 10. 
73. See supra text accompanying notes 70-71. 
74. 401 U.S. at 430-32. 
75. See infra note 87 and accompanying text. 
76. For a discussion of the objective of Title VII and its role in Teal see infra text 
accompanying notes 98-100. 
77. The plaintiffs sought to hold the state liable for a violation of Title VII. See 
supra text accompanying notes 23-24. If, on remand, the state cannot prove that the test 
is job-related, then it will have violated the requirements of Title VII, as interpreted by 
Griggs. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52. If the state can prove that the test is 
job-related, then it will have fulfilled the requirements of Title VII. Also, even if the state 
can prove that the test is job-related, plaintiffs may prevail if they show that the state was 
using the test as a mere pretext for discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. , 422 U.S. at 425; 
Do/hard, 433 U.S. at 329. 
78. 457 U.S. at 456. Some observers would disagree with the Court's view that, 
although statistics show that the protected group as a whole might not have been discrim­
inated against, there was discrimination against individual members of the protected 
group who did not meet the specific criterion that had the disparate impact. These ob­
servers state: 
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previously noted, the primary focus of the bottom line approach is 
on the percentage of minorities or women who are actually hired 
rather than on a single criterion in the overall hiring process.79 The 
Court, however, declined to adopt the bottom line approach because 
the concept: (1) ignored the Title VII guarantee of equal employ­
ment opportunity to all individuals;80 and (2) would allow employers 
to discriminate against some individuals merely because they favora­
bly treated other members of the employees' group.8l 
Although the Court did not adopt the bottom line approach in 
Teal, it did employ disparate impact analysis.82 According to some 
commentators, the proper focus of disparate impact analysis is on 
the treatment of the class as a whole.83 Upon examination of its 
prior disparate impact cases, including Griggs, Albemarle, and 
Do/hard, the Supreme Court in Teal stated: 
In considering claims of disparate impact under § 703(a)(2) this 
This contention would seem to have no merit. . . since it fails to perceive the 
fundamental nature of the disparate impact theory of discrimination. An indi­
vidual member of a class achieves an individual right to relief not on the basis 
of disparate treatment directed against that individual, but simply because the 
individual realizes an incidental benefit from class-wide discrimination proved 
by a disparate impact against the class. Unlike the disparate treatment theory 
of discrimination, which focuses on individual rights, the disparate impact the­
ory of discrimination focuses solely on the treatment of the class of a whole. If 
there is no disparate impact as to the class, there are no individuals to realize 
incidental benefits from such disparate impact. 
B. SCHLEl & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1192. The dissenting Justices in Teal would 
agree with Schlei and Grossman's discussion of the bottom line concept in disparate 
impact cases. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
79. 	 See supra note 6. 
80. 	 457 U.S. at 453. 
81. Id. at 455. The Court also rejected an argument based on another section of 
Title VII. The United States Department of Justice, in an amicus curiae brief, sought to 
support the district court's judgment that the plaintiffs had not established a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination by relying on Section 703(h) of Title VII. Id. at 451­
52. 	 Section 703(h) provides in part: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, it shall not be an unlawful 
employment practice for an employer ... to give and to act upon the results of 
any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administra­
tion or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate 
because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(h) (1976). The government argued that the test administered by the 
state was not "used to discriminate" because it did not actually deprive disproportionate 
numbers of blacks of promotions. 457 U.S. at 452. The Court, however, stated t~at the 
government's reliance on Section 703(h) was "misplaced" in that Congress, in enacting 
that section, "intended only to make clear that tests that were job related would be per­
missible despite their disparate impact." Id. (emphasis in original). 
82. 	 See supra note 4. 
83. B. SCHLEl & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1192. 
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Court has consistently focused on employment and promotion re­
quirements that create a discriminatory bar to opportunities. This 
Court has never read § 703(a)(2) as requiring the focus to be 
placed on the overall number of minority or female applicants ac­
tually hired or promoted.84 
Simply stated, the Court believed that its prior disparate impact 
cases focused on the specific employment requirement, rather than 
on the total selection process, in order to determine if there was an 
adverse impact on minorities or women. 
In contrast, the dissenting opinion stated that the Court's "dis­
parate impact cases consistently have considered whether the result 
of an employer's lolal seleclion process has an adverse impact upon 
the protected group."85 It is clear that Justice Powell's dissenting 
opinion took a fundamentally different view of the Court's previous 
disparate impact decisions. Indeed, stating that those cases were of 
questionable relevance to the issue presented in Teal, Justice Powell 
suggested86 that the Court follow lower court decisions87 on the bot­
84. 457 U.S. at 450 (emphasis in original). 
85. /d. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). The dissent also stated 
that in Griggs and its progeny the Court "considered, not whether the claimant as an 
individual had been classified in a manner impermissible under § 703(a)(2), but whether 
an employer's procedures have had an adverse impact on the protected group to which 
the individual belongs." Id. at 459. (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). In 
addition to its disagreement with the majority view of the Court's prior disparate impact 
decisions, the dissenting opinion also asserted that the plaintiffs sought to combine the 
disparate impact and disparate treatment theories by proving a violation of Title VII by 
reference to group figures and then denying the defendant the opportunity to rebut the 
evidence by introducing similar figures. Id. at 459-60. 
86. 457 U.S. at 460 n.5. 
87. Id. See, e.g., Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board, 474 F. Supp. 1256 (D. 
Conn. 1979). Brown, decided in the same district court as Teal, although by a different 
judge, involved a claim of racial discrimination in hiring for the New Haven Police De­
partment due to a written exam's disproportionate impact on blacks. The selection pro­
cess included a written exam and an agility test which were scored separately and then 
combined to determine whether the applicant passed or failed. The plaintiffs failed to get 
past the written exam!agility test stage of the selection process. The court recognized 
that the exam "was a pass-fail hurdle that could prevent an applicant from entering the 
pool from which hiring decisions were made ...." Id. at 1262. Nonetheless, as in 
Teal, the district court adopted the bottom line approach and held that the plaintiffs had 
not made a prima facie case of employment discrimination. Id. See also EEOC v. Grey­
hound Lines, 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980) (EEOC brought suit on behalf of employee 
denied public-contact job because he wore a beard due to skin disorder unique to blacks; 
EEOC claimed employer's no-beard policy had disparate impact on blacks; court 
adopted the bottom line approach and held that it need not consider the alleged disparate 
impact because there was no actual discrimination in hiring); EEOC v. Navajo Refining 
Co., 593 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1979) (employment requirements eliminated a dispropor­
tionate number of Spanish-surnamed Americans (SSA's); actual percentage of SSA's 
hired, however, compared favorably with the percentage of Anglos hired; court stated 
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tom line issue. A majority of those lower court decisions hold that 
"the selection process as a whole, rather than any segment of it, 
should be examined for disproportionate impact on a Title VII 
case."88 
Despite the existence of the lower court opinions, a slim major­
ity of the Court opted to focus on the source of the disparate impact 
rather than on the bottom line.89 Thus, as a result of Teal, the dispa­
rate impact principle may be applied in situations where a particular 
component of an employment selection process has a discriminatory 
impact on a protected group but the overall process does not.90 
C. Analysis 
Application of the bottom line approach in a factual setting 
such as Teal would result in a finding of no violation of Title VII. 
This follows from the fact that there would be no discrimination as a 
result of the final hiring or promotion decision. Likewise, an appli­
cation of the dissenting opinion's view of the disparate impact prin­
ciple9\ would result in a finding of no violation of Title VII because 
there would be no disparate impact on the protected group as a 
that Congress directed the thrust of the Civil Rights Act to the consequences of employ­
ment practices and held that the employer was free to use the requirements if the result 
was not discrimination in fact); Friend v. Leidinger, 588 F.2d 61 (4th Cir. 1978) (black 
fire fighters challenged disparate impact of written promotional exam; court considered 
the entire selection process, not just one segment; looking at the bottom line, the court 
held that there was no adverse impact on blacks); Rule v. Ironworkers Local 396, 568 
F.2d 558 (8th Cir. 1977) (aptitude test in an employment selection process had disparate 
raCial impact; court viewed selection process as a whole and held that plaintiffs did not 
establish a prima facie case); Lee v. City of Richmond, 456 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1978) 
(employment test had an adverse impact on blacks; court stated that the crucial fact in 
determining disparate impact is the rate at which blacks are ultimately chosen for the 
position rather than their test scores in the selection process). But see Reynolds v. Sheet 
Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952 (D.C. 1980) (certain requirements for en­
trance into union training program had disparate impact on blacks; defendant asserted a 
bottom line defense but court stated that the bottom line defense was flawed); League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976) 
(tests for positions as policemen and fire fighters had a disparate impact on Mexican­
Americans; defendant argued for a bottom line approach; court held that the plaintiffs' 
showing of disparate impact constituted a prima facie case of discrimination). 
88. Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board, 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1261 (D. Conn. 
1979). 
89. 457 U.S. at 450. 
90. For a discussion of the significance of Tea! in the development of the disparate 
impact principle see infra text accompanying notes 104-111. 
91. 457 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J.. dissenting). Justice Powell's dissenting opinion 
maintained that when a court is applying the disparate impact principle it should ex­
amine the final result of an employment selection process, i.e. the bottom line, for dis­
crimination in a Title VII case. Id. 
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whole.92 The Court in Teal, however, refused to apply the bottom 
line approach93 and nonetheless found a violation of Title VII. Its 
finding was based on two factors: the Court's reading of its previous 
disparate impact cases and the objective of Title VII.94 
Based upon the Court's reading of its previous cases, including 
Griggs,Albemarle, and Dothard,95 the Court determined that appro­
priate focus of disparate impact analysis was on the specific require­
ment within the employment selection process, rather than on the 
entire process.96 Specifically, the Court determined that disparate 
impact analysis properly focused on employment and promotion re­
quirements that create a discriminatory bar to opportunities.97 
The objective of Title VII was the second factor in the Court's 
decision.98 Citing to language in Griggs, the Court stated that the 
objective of Section 703(a)(2) is "to achieve equality of employment 
opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to 
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employ­
ees."99 Faced with the fact that the bottom line approach would 
thwart that objective,IOO the Court chose to render a decision consis­
tent with the objective of Title VII. The Court preserved the plain­
tiffs' right to equal employment opportunity under Title VII by 
invalidating the discriminatory test barrier despite the nondiscrimi­
natory bottom line. As a result of its focus on a particular compo­
92. Under both the bottom line approach and the dissenting opinion's view of the 
focus of the disparate impact principle there is no violation of Title VII because there is 
no disparate impact at the bottom line. This argument is based on statistics which show 
that 22.9% of the black candidates and 13.5% of the white candidates were promoted 
despite the fact that 54.17% of the black candidates and 79.54% of the white candidates 
passed the exam. See supra text accompanying notes 18-28. 
93. 457 U.S. at 453. 
94. Id. at 446-51; see infra text accompanying note 99. 
95. 457 U.S. at 446-47, 450-51. 
96. Id. at 450. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 448. 
99. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 
(1971». 
100. The bottom line approach requires that the final result of the employment 
selection process, rather than any segment of it, be examined for discrimination in a 
disparate impact case. See supra note 6. The objective of Section 703(a)(2) is to remove 
discriminatory barriers which prevent equal employment" opportunity. See supra text 
accompanying note 99. Those persons failing to get past the discriminatory barrier cre­
ated by the test in Teal will not be afforded equal employment opportunity under the 
bottom line approach because that concept is concerned only with the final result of the 
selection process, which in Teal was not discriminatory. Thus, because of its focus on the 
final result of the selection process, application of the bottom line approach in a factual 
setting such as Teal would thwart the objective of Section 703(a)(2). 
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nent of a selection process, rather than on the overall process, the 
Court was able to fulfill the objective of Title VII. 
A common thread running through both the Court's discussion 
of its previous disparate impact cases and its discussion of the objec­
tive of Title VII is the great emphasis placed on affording individuals 
equal employment opportunity. Throughout its opinion, the Court 
stressed constantly the importance of eliminating barriers that would 
deprive individual minorities of "the opportunity to compete equally 
with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria."101 It is clear 
that "opportunity" was the key focus of the Court's decision in Teal. 
The conclusion reached by the Court in Teal was necessary to 
continue the progress made in employment discrimination law since 
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.102 Any decision to the 
contrary would have been a serious setback for those concerned with 
affording equal employment opportunity to all individuals. Had the 
bottom line concept been adopted, the plaintiffs, as individuals, 
would have been denied an equal employment opportunity since 
they had been permanently barred from consideration for promotion 
by the disparate impact of the test. Such a denial of equal employ­
ment opportunity would have been inconsistent with the stated ob­
jective of Title VII.103 . 
Along with fulfilling the goal of Title VII, the Court further de­
fined the focus of the disparate impact principle. I04 In Teal, the 
101. 457 U.S. at 451 (emphasis in original). 
102. See general(y Belton, Title VII of {he Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade 0/ 
Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST. LOUIS U.L.l. 225 (1976). The 
author of the foregoing article served as counsel for the plaintiffs in Griggs, Albemarle, 
and other employment discrimination cases. Belton writes: 
The relatively short history of enforcement under the Act has spawned 
three generations of issues. The first generation embraced procedural problems 
. . . . The second generation of issues included the definition of an unlawful 
employment practice and the type and quantum of proof necessary to establish 
a claim under the Act. In the third generation of issues the courts face the 
problems of formulating appropriate and effective remedies. 
Individual and class actions were filed under Title VII as early as October, 
1965. Despite some earlier adverse decisions by the district courts, it became 
clear after several years of litigation that in light of the broad wording of the 
Act and the receptivity of the courts persons victimized by employment dis­
crimination would have some measure of success. . . . Ten years of vigorous, 
aggressive, and protracted litigation. . . have demonstrated that Title VII can 
be a powerful agent to redress employment discrimination. 
Id. at 228-30 (footnotes omitted). 
103. See supra text accompanying note 99. 
104. The Supreme Court in Griggs established the disparate impact principle: that 
Title VII forbids the use of any employment requirements or practices that are discrimi­
natory in effect, unless proven to be job-related. 401 U.S. at 431; see supra text accompa­
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Court used the disparate impact principle to provide individuals 
with equal employment opportunity. 105 In theory, the disparate im­
pact principle had been concerned only with possible discriminatory 
treatment of protected groups as a whole. 106 Individuals achieved a 
right to relief under the theory only by realizing an incidental benefit 
from class-wide discrimination that had been proven by a disparate 
impact against the group.107 The dissenting opinion in Teal argued 
that it was improper, under the disparate impact principle, to give 
the individual plaintiffs relief when statistics showed that there was 
no disparate impact at the bottom line.108 The majority, however, 
decided that the proper focus of the disparate impact principle was 
on the particular segment of the employment selection process that 
created the discrimination, rather than the final result of that pro­
cess.109 By focusing on the test for promotion, rather than on the 
bottom line, the Court in Teal found that there was discrimination 
because of the test's disparate impact on blacks.llo As a result of that 
focus, the individual plaintiffs received an incidental benefit from 
the discrimination. The incidental benefit was the Court's determi­
nation that they had established a prima facie case of employment 
nying notes 45-52. In Albemarle the Court set forth what an employer must show to 
prove that a requirement or practice is job-related. 422 U.S. at 435-36; see supra text 
accompanying notes 53-60. In Do/hard the Court determined what types of statistics 
may be used to prove disparate impact. 433 U.S. at 331-32; see supra text accompanying 
notes 61-69. In Teal, the Court continued the evolution of the disparate impact principle 
as represented by these prior cases. The Court further defined the disparate impact prin­
ciple by holding that it should focus on the discriminatory segment of the employment 
selection process rather than on the nondiscriminatory final result of that process. See 
457 U.S. at 450. 
105. Although the Court held that plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination, the defendant may rebut that case on remand by proving 
that the test is job-related. See supra note 4. 
106. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1192. This is the main point of 
disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinions in Teal. The majority be­
lieved that the disparate impact principle had traditionally focused on the discriminatory 
element of an employment selection process, rather than on the total selection process. 
457 U.S. at 450. The dissent believed that the total selection process should be examined 
for disparate impact, rather than the specific element within that process. Id. at 458 
(Powell, J., dissenting). 
107. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 4, at 1192. 
108. 457 U.S. at 459 (Powell, J., dissenting). In this context the "relief' was a 
finding that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of employment discrimina­
tion under Section 703(a)(2), not that the defendant was liable for a violation of that 
section. The defendant may avoid a finding of liability on remand by proving that the 
test is job-related. See supra note 4. 
109. 457 U.S. at 450. 
110. Id. at 448; see supra text accompanying notes 77-78. 
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discrimination under Section 703(a)(2).11I Therefore, by determin­
ing that the principle should concentrate on the discriminatory seg­
ment of the employment selection process rather than on the final 
result of that process, the Court has further defined the focus of the 
disparate impact principle. 
D. Further Utility of the Bottom Line Defense 
An important aspect of Teal was the fact that the written test 
constituted a pass-fail barrier beyond which failing candidates could 
not proceed. I 12 It is arguable that had the plaintiffs been allowed to 
participate in the entire selection process, the bottom line defense 
may have been acceptable to the Court. In such a situation, the test 
alone would not have been the sole determinative under which ap­
plicants would be considered for promotion. Consequently, the 
Court would be more inclined to examine the overall results of the 
selection process for disparate impact. l13 
It is not clear, however, whether the Court would accept this 
argument. As previously stated, Teal placed great weight on the im­
portance of eliminating barriers that would deprive individual mi­
norities the opportunity to compete equally with white workers on 
the basis of job-related criteria. I 14 Even if the plaintiffs were given a 
chance to participate in the entire selection process, the disparate im-
III. Id. at 451. 
112. Id. at 443-44. 
113. This argument may be implied from the Second Circuit's statement: 
Viewing the overall results of a selection process ordinarily is a prudent course 
to pursue, since it places the burden upon the defendant to demonstrate job­
relatedness only in situations in which courts can determine with some degree 
of certainty that a selection device has discriminatorily denied an employment 
opportunity to members of a protected class. Where all the candidates partici­
pate in the entire selection process, and the overall results reveal no significant 
disparity of impact, scrutinizing individual questions or individual sub-tests 
would, indeed, "contlict(] with the dictates of common sense." 
Teal v. Connecticut, 645 F.2d at 138 (footnote omitted) (quoting Kirkland v. New York 
State Dep't of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 429 U.S. 
823». The Second Circuit discussed Kirkland and Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492 (6th 
Cir. 1975), cerl. denied, 426 U.S. 934. In both these cases the respective courts adopted 
the bottom line approach. The Second Circuit, however, properly distinguished its hold­
ing in Teal from Kirkland and Smith. In both Kirkland and Smith, the passing score on 
employment tests was cumulative and all of the candidates were "subjected to the com­
plete selection process, which, when viewed as a whole, did not produce unlawful dispa­
rate results." 645 F.2d at 137-38. The test in Teal constituted a pass-fail barrier. Thus, 
Kirkland and Smith are strong support for the Second Circuit's "implied" argument that 
the bottom line defense may be acceptable if the plaintiffs are allowed to participate in 
the entire selection process. 
114. 457 U.S. at 451. 
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pact of the test would still be present, thereby effectively reducing the 
individual candidate's chances for promotion. Thus, because of the 
Court's overriding concern with any factor that might affect equal 
job opportunities for individuals, 115 the bottom line defense may be 
of little help to defendants in future Title VII cases. I 16 
IV. ApPLICABILITY OF THE UNIFORM GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYEE 
SELECTION PROCEDURES 
In an effort to persuade the Court to adopt the bottom line ap­
proach, the state suggested that the Uniform Guidelines On Em­
ployee Selection Procedures 117 be applied. 1I8 Section l607.4C of the 
Uniform Guidelines states in part: "If ... the total selection pro­
cess does not have an adverse impact, the Federal enforcement agen­
cies, in the exercise of their administrative and prosecutorial 
discretion, in usual circumstances, will not. . . take enforcement ac­
tion based upon adverse impact of any component of that process 
...."119 Simply stated, the agencies will usually initiate enforce­
. ment action only where an employer violates the 80% rule set forth 
in Section l607.4D of the Uniform Guidelines. 12o 
The Supreme Court has stated that the administrative interpre­
tation of the Civil Rights Act by the enforcing agency is entitled to 
great deference. 121 The Court declined to defer to the guidelines in 
115. Id. 
116. It must be remembered, however, that Teal was a slim 5-4 decision. There 
were very strong arguments both for and against adoption of the bottom line approach. 
Given a slight change in Court personnel, the bottom line defense may be adopted and 
the Teal decision limited to its facts alone. 
117. See supra note 21. 
118. 457 U.S. at 453 n.12. 
119. Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4C 
(1982). 
120. Id. § 1607.40. 
121. Griggs, 40 I U.S. at 433-34. There are actually four "enforcing agencies" with 
respect to the Uniform Guidelines. See supra note 21. For the purpose of this note the 
most important of these agencies is the EEOC. At its creation in 1964 the EEOC could 
not prosecute alleged discriminators; its functions were limited to investigation of com­
plaints, determination of "reasonable cause" to believe discrimination existed, and con­
ciliation. Blumrosen, The DOl/om Line In Equal Employment Guidelines: Administering A 
Polycentric Problem, 33Ao. L. REV. 323,324 (1981). In 1972, however, Congress author­
ized the EEOC to sue private employers if conciliation failed. Equal Employment Op­
portunity Act of 1972,86 Stat. 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & 
Supp. V 1981». The Uniform Guidelines are generally viewed as the EEOC's interpreta­
tion of Title VII. As will be seen, however, this is not the view of the guidelines taken in 
Teal. See infra text accompanying notes 122-130. 
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this case,122 however, because it adhered to the view that the enforc­
ing agencies were "treating the 'bottom line' issue as a matter of 
prosecutorial discretion rather than as an interpretation of the 
statute." 123 
Also, in what has been called an "English translation,"124 the 
enforcing agencies published an overview of the Uniform Guide­
lines.125 In this overview, the agencies stated that the guidelines "do 
not address the underlying question of law,"126 and that an individ­
ual who is the victim of a discriminatory component in an otherwise 
nondiscriminatory selection process "retains the right to proceed 
through the appropriate agencies, and into Federal court."127 
In summation, the section of the Uniform Guidelines dealing 
with the bottom line issue l28 is not an interpretation of Section 
703(a)(2). Instead, it is an administrative "tool" used by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and the other enforcing 
agencies to determine whether to initiate enforcement action against 
employers who discriminate. 129 The Court, therefore, declined the 
state's suggestion to apply the guidelines in Teal. l3O 
122. 457 U.S. at 453 n.12. But see Brown v. New Haven Civil Service Board, 474 
F. Supp. 	1256 (D. Conn. 1979). 
The E.E.O.C. and other federal enforcement agencies have also adopted a "bot­
tom line" approach in deciding when to bring action against employers. This 
policy controls the exercise of prosecutorial discretion; but in allocating re­
sources of government agencies, it also indicates a threshold of administrative 
concern about different hiring practices. At least in the absence of discrimina­
tory intent, the threshold of judicial inquiry should be set at the same level. 
Id. at 1263 n.lO. 
123. Blumrosen, supra note 121, at 331. In this article, Professor Blumrosen, coun­
sel to the chair of the EEOC, has reported a personal account of the development of the 
Uniform Guidelines. He writes: 
There was serious objection to the "bottom line" concept in the EEOC General 
Counsel's Office . . . . I believed we could avoid internal conflict by treating 
the "bottom line" issue as a matter of prosecutorial discretion rather than as an 
interpretation of the statute. This approach would lead government agencies to 
concentrate on cases where there was overall adverse impact. 
Id. 
124. Id. at 336. 
125. See 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978). 
126. Id. at 38,291. The ''underlying question oflaw" refers to whether the bottom 
line defense will be upheld as legally valid. 
127. /d. 
128. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
129. See supra text accompanying notes 119-120. 
130. 457 U.S. at 453 n. 13. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The plaintiffs in Teal claimed that the written test given to em­
ployees seeking promotion to Welfare Eligibility Supervisors had a 
disparate impact on minorities. The Supreme Court held that this 
disparate impact established a prima facie case of employment dis­
crimination under Section 703(a)(2) of Title VII despite the defend­
ant's nondiscriminatory bottom line defense. The Court based its 
holding on two factors: the Court's reading of its previous disparate 
impact decisions and the objective of Title VII.131 As a result of 
Teal, plaintiff-employees may establish a prima facie case of em­
ployment discrimination based solely on the disparate impact of one 
segment of the employment selection process even if the statistics 
reveal that there is no disparate impact on the plaintiffs' group at the 
bottom line. 
The Teal decision has continued the evolution of the disparate 
impact principle. 132 The Court decided that the proper focus of the 
disparate impact principle was on the particular segment of the em­
ployment selection process that created the discrimination, rather 
than on the final result of that process. 133 In so finding, the Court 
further has defined the focus of the disparate impact principle. 134 
Despite the existence of many lower court decisions that hold to 
the contrary,135 the Court also held that an employer's nondiscrimi­
natory bottom line is no defense to an employee's prima facie case of 
disparate impact. Throughout its opinion, the Court placed great 
emphasis on affording individuals equal employment opportunity. 
As a result of this emphasis on "opportunity", the bottom line de­
fense may be little help to employers in future Title VII cases and 
will be no help when the employment requirement involved consti­
tutes a pass-fail barrier beyond which failing candidates are not per­
mitted to proceed. 136 
Finally, the Court rejected the defendant's suggestion that the 
Uniform Guidelines On Employee Selection Procedures be followed 
in this case.137 The Uniform Guidelines advocate a bottom line ap­
proach, but only as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. Thus, be­
131. See supra text accompanying notes 94-100. 
132. See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
133. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 104-111. 
135. See supra note 87. 
136. See supra text accompanying notes 112-116. 
137. See supra text accompanying notes 117-130. 
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cause the guidelines are not an interpretation of Section 703(a)(2), 
the Court declined to follow them in Teal. 
James P. Rock 
